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I. 
TKS Vt.TIIATION OF TH:S CH.:,.RI 'i'ABLE TRUST 
INTRODUCTION 
Benevolence in the literal senr;e of well willing but 
not in the more commendable degree of beneficence in the 
sense of well doing characterises the approach of the 
New Zealand Courts to the va:-iation of chari te.ble trusts. 
The fault is both the Legislature's and the Courts'. 
The remedy is in the hands of both. 
The Legislature has enacted such inadequate, badly 
and incompletely drafted legislation in the form of the 
Charitable Trusts Act 1957 that on a number of occasions 
both Judge and Counsel have been forced to speculate 
(and incorrectly) on its meaning and effect. And the 
Courts (perhaps partly as a result of such mis-spent 
energy) have often totally misapprehended and misconceived 
the Legislature's intent when the Courts have either 
considered or ought to have been considering other 
sections in the same larnente.ble enactment. The Courts 
do at times acknowledge the existence of these other 
statutory provisions but then often doggedly invoke the 
cy-pres doctrine so that the wishes of the settler or 
the testator (as the case may be) are accorded dominance 
and no~ the available freedom of application and variation 
so untidily indicated by the Legislature. 
It is this unnecessary and unauthorised resurrection 
by the Courts of the cy-pres doctrine (which was intended 
to be lawfully buried by the Charitable Trusts Act 1957) 
and the m~zddled e}...1)ression of the Legislature's intent in 
ttat enactment which have both gone long unnoticed in New 
Zealand and th8reby hindered the evolution and perfection 
of an .: r'.9 ortant branch of law to society. 
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2. 
The task now is to see how and why the Courts are 
inhibiting the~selves in their approach to the variation 
of existing charitabl~ trusts and at the same time to 
reveal what inadequate statutory mechanism the 
Legislature has provided the Courts with. 
'rhe mistakes of the Courts can be prevented to a 
large extent by enjoining them to read a New Zealand 
decision (Public Truste~ v. A.G. (1923) NZLR 433 which 
eloquently enshrir.es all the principles which today 
they shoulc be correctly invoking and applying. The 
fault lies partly with Counsel and so too does the 
remedy of drawing to the Court's attention the principles 
to be applied. 
Indeed the misconceptions and misapprehensions 
appear to manifest themselves in the law profession 
generally a:id notably in the works of New Zealand text-
book writers on the law of trusts. 
It is immediately necessary to explain that the 
terms "charity" and "charitable" as applied in c~~ari table 
trusts have thro~gh legal decisions on their inception 
and variation received a tecP ..... '1ical and sor!lewhat narrower 
meaning than that popularly ascribed to those two words. 
The four heads of charity now co~~only adopted in common 
law countries are those set out in Lord ~acnaghten's 
judgment in Cor.i.!--r1issio!~r s for Speci a l Pu poses of the 
Income Tax v. Perr. sel (1891) A.C. 531 at 583. His words, 
as has often been pointed out, are not original, being 
dravm from the argument of Sir SaJiuel Romilly in his 
reply in Morice v. ~J shop of Durham (1805) 10 Ves. 522. 
[ , . 
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Shortly stated the four heads are (i) religion, (ii) 
poverty, (iii) education, and (iv) "other purposes 
beneficial to the community". Sir 38-ffiuel Romilly 
described the last head as being "the most difficult" 
and the phrase he used is "the advancement of objects 
of general public utility". Not every object coming 
within one or other of these categories is charitable 
but every object which is to rank as charitable must 
either fit into one or more of the first three 
categories, or, if not, may still be held charitable 
because of general public utility. All charitable 
trusts must therefore be of a public nature: that is, 
intended to benefit the community or some part of it: 
Re Macduff, Macduff v. Macduff (1896) 2 Ch. 451. 
The doctrine of cy-pres was developed so that the 
three related privileges (certainty of object, application 
of the rule against perpetuities and the treatment of 
imperfect appointments) conferred on charitable trusts 
by Ecclesiastical Courts might not be defeated. It is 
essentially a device for keeping in existence a gift 
to charity so that it may continue as a public benefit. 
Its limitations often arise from the principle that the 
donor's, settlor's or testator's wishes must be respected 
though the endowment could often be put to better use. 
In its modern application the doctrine denotes and 
is applied "as near as possible"; and the Courts have 
constantly insisted upon getting as close as possible to 
the settler's original intention. 
New Zealand has now largely abandoned (at least 
4. 
notionally for it is still unnecessarily invoked) the 
cy-pres doctrine through evolving statutory modes 
culminating in the Charitable Trusts Act 1957 which 
in relation to the variation of subsisting purposes 
of charitable trusts was intended to int~oduce both 
certainty and flexibility and to avoid much litigation. 
That culmination is demonstrated by the presence of 
those two all-embracing exemption clauses: "(whether 
or not there is any general charitable intention)" 
in section 32 (Part III) and again (without the 
parentheses) in section 40 (Part IV). 
The general jurisdiction of the Supre~e Ccurt 
concerning charitable trusts was origi.nally grounded 
upon section 5 of the Supreme Court Act 1860 which 
had provided that: 
The Court shall also have within the Colony 
all such equitable and cornmon· law jurisdiction 
as the Lord High Chancellor of England; the 
Court of Chancery, or any other Supreme Court 
of Equity hath in England ••• so far as the 
same shall be applicable to the circumstances 
of the Colony. 
That section was re-enacted in the Supreme Court Act 
1882 by section 16 which statute wa s subsequently replaced 
by the Judicature Act 1908 the statute now in force which 
by virtue of section 16 conferred on the Supreme Court: 
••• all the jurisdiction which it had on the 
coming into operation of the Act and all 
judicial jurisdiction which may be necessary 
to administer the laws of New Zealand. 
! • 
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The Supreme Cou::::-t has therefore the general 
jurisdiction derived through the Judicature Act 1908, 
the specific jurisdi ction confe rred by the statute 
now in force deali:Jg with char 5_table trusts and the 
re3idual jurisdiction lyirig dormant in New Zealand 
under the cy-pres doctrine. 
The birt h,death and then the unauthorised 
resurrection of the cy-pres doctrine may be considered 
by examining the appropriate statutes (with the 
relevant case law) under these heads: 
(I) 
(II) 
(III) 
(IV) 
(V) 
(VI) 
The Charitable Fll.Ilds Appropriation Act 1871 
The Charitable Trusts Exter.sion Act 1886 
The Religious, Charitable and Educational 
Trusts Act 1908 
The Charitable Trusts Act 1957 
Su.rnmary of principles 
Conclusions, and then Recommendations. 
(I) TffS C:f)_RITABLE FUNDS A? PP.OFRT J.TION AC_! 1871 
The original legislation in New Zealand was the 
Charitable Funds Appropriation Act 1871 the preamble to 
which rec5-ted: 
Whereas it has happened or it may happen that 
moneys have been or may be rai s ed by voluntary 
contributions or otherwise for particular 
purposes of a charitable kind and aft erwards 
it has or may become i mpossible or inexpedient 
to apply the same or a r e sidue thereof to 
such particular purpose or such purpose may be 
uncertain or illegal and it is expedient that 
in such ca ses the moneys so rai s ed should be 
6. 
lawfully applicable to other purposes of a 
charitable kind ••• 
The conditions precedent necescary before the Act 
could be invoked were therefore impossibility, 
impracticability, inexpedience, fulfilment, illegality 
or uncertainty as are more fully set forth in section 4. 
The definition of "charitabl-e purpose" given in 
section 2 was significantly wider than that ascribed 
to in the subsequent repealing Act (The Charitable 
Trusts Extension Act 1886) for it included many 
purposes which would not be considered charitable under 
the common law: for example the promotion of athletic 
sports and wholesome recreation and amusements of the 
people; contributions towards losses by fire and other 
inevitable accidents; the encouragement of skill, 
industry and frugality; rewards for acts of courage 
and self-sacrifice. 
Section 3 of the Act declared that the Act "shall be 
applicable to cases in which money has been raised by way 
of voluntary contribution or cy the sale of goods 
voluntarily contributed or as the price of admission to 
any entertainment given for any charitable purposes or 
in any other manner of voluntary contributions." 
Any contributor to or the holder of money raised 
"may call together a meeting of contributors of money or 
goods" by means of advertisements and "the advertisements 
shall contain a statement of the reason why it is 
proposed that the money should be applied to a 
different charitable purpose than the original and shall 
• I 
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specify the newly proposed charitable purpose": section 6(4) • 
Moreover, it "shall be competent for any other contributor 
to give notice by advertisement in the same newspapers in 
which the original advertisement was published at least 
three times before the day fixed for the meeting that he 
will propose at the sarae meeting some other charitable 
purpose than that mentioned in the first advertisements 
of the meeting and such other purpose shall be distinctly 
specified in such notice": section 7. 
All parties interested in and either in support of 
or in opposition to the proposed scheme had to give such 
public notice: those who initiated "a different charitable 
purpose" had to give a statement of the reason why it 
was proposed and were compelled to specify the newly 
proposed charitable purpose; those who opposed had to 
advertise and distinctly specify the nature of the charitable 
purpose that they would propose. There was thus the 
requirement that a full disclosure had to be made of the 
type and nature of the contributor's proposed scheme and 
the different purpose proposed by any other contributor. 
Detailed provisions were made (in section 8) concerning 
proceedings at the meeting called by the moving contributor 
or money holder. "It shall be competent for any contributor 
to propose at the meeting that the purpose to which the 
money shall be applied shall be one combined of any of the 
advertised purposes or any portions thereof and the meeting 
may take the same into consideration and vote thereupon at 
the same time as upon the advertised propositions": 
section 8(6). There was provision for the adjournment 
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on the proposal of an unadvertised purpose, with advertisement 
of the consequent meeting on "the specific character of 
the purposes which he (the proposer of such new purpose) 
intends to propose at such adjourned meeting": section 8(8). 
And "at the 2.djourned meeting all the purposes which have 
been duly advertised shall be put together to the vote and 
that one shall be declared to be adopted for which a 
majority of votes shall then be given": section 8(9). 
The scheme when prepared had to be laid before the 
Attorney-General (section 10) who if "he shall consider 
the scheme proposed proper to effect the resolution of 
the meeting of contributors and not contrary to law 
shall certify the same and a verified copy of such scheme 
and certificate shall be filed in the office of the 
Registrar of the Supreme Court ••• and an office copy 
thereof shall be admissible prima facie as proof of the 
scheme and certificate." (The meaning and intent of the 
later part of this section 11 is examined post). 
If the Attorney-General considered that the scheme 
"will not properly carry into effect the resolution of 
the contributors" then he could remit the proposed scheme 
to the Scheme Committee accompanied by a memorandum 
containing his objections to the scheme as proposed: 
section 12. If the Attorney-General considered that the 
purpose is "contrary to law public policy or good morals 
he may refuse to certify the scheme proposed" and the 
grounds of such refusal are to be gazetted pursuant to 
section 13. A fresh meeting of contributors could subsequently 
be called within three months: section 14. 
'j 
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The whole tenor of the Charitable Funds Appropriation 
Act 1871 was the fullest public disclosure of the proposed 
scheme and the reasons for such and the provision for 
people aggrieved by it to advertise a different scheme 
and then for a meeting to decide what scheme should be 
formulated and laid before the Attorney-General. The 
Court was not acting (as it is compelled to do under the 
Charitable Tr~sts Act 1957 and under its immediate 
successors) upon the trustees' scheme alone. 
The Act of 1871 gave the fullest opportunity for the 
reasons for a competing scheme to be considered and then 
either accepted in part or in toto or rejected outright 
or combined with the moving contributor's or money-· 
holder's scheme and for the scheme voted on to go before 
the Court. (There is no demonstrable reason why similar 
provisions should not have been made to apply under the 
Charitable Trusts Act 1957 to the variation of existing 
charitable schemes under Part III of that Act so that the 
Court is acquainted with the fullest degree of information 
instead of conceivably having to reject a potentially 
good scheme which it may feel may be otherwise advantageous 
to that proposed by the trustee s but which it is unable 
then to accept for the scheme has not then been reported 
on by the Attorney-General. The Court can only approve 
or reject the scheme submitted to it under Part III and 
has no authority either to approve any alternative scheme 
or to accept and approve a combination of the scheme 
submitted to it with that of part of such alternative 
scheme put forward by parties in opposition. The Court 
10. 
should be empowered to approve not only the whole o!' part 
of the advertised scheme but as well any part or parts of 
the whole of any alternative purposes 5eparate from or 
combined with the advertised scheme. The validity of this 
criticism will become apparent as this evolutionary 
study of the various Acts continues). 
While this Act was in force the New Zealand Supreme 
Court dealt with three cases concerning charities and 
invoked the com.~on law. 
The Supreme Court has the general controlling 
jurisdiction over all charities and has ample jurisdiction 
to execute the intention of the testator cy-pres: 
\'Tellington ~cat ion Board v. Harrison (1875) 1 N.Z. Jur (N.S.) 
S.C. 66; Wi Para.ta v. Bishop of Wellington (1877) 3 N.Z. Jur. 
(N.S.) S.C. 72. In At t orney-General v. Btg}£1.Y (1874) 2 N.Z. 
(N.S.) 419 it was held that the revenues of a New Zealand 
province came within the definition of "charitable fund", 
over which the Court of Chancery then exercised jurisdiction 
and were therefore subject to the control of the New Zealand 
Supreme Court. 
(II) THE CHAIUTA.BLE TRUSTS EXTENSION J..C'r 1886 
The Charitable Trusts Extension Act 1886 provided that 
property held in terms of the Act for certain charitable 
purposes could be disposed of for other charitable purposes 
and it provided (in section 2) a fairly exhaustive definition 
of "charitable purpose" to include: 
(i) The promotion of any of the objects and purposes 
for which the institutions specified in the 
Hospitals and Charitable Institutions Act 1885 
had been established: provision for the 
r 
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managemen-: of public hospitals end charitable 
institutions and distribution of charitable 
ai.d. 
(ii) the support of the sick, .sged, destitute, 
poor or helpless persons or of the expenses 
of funerals of poor persons; 
(iii) the education, physical, mental, technical or 
social of the poor or indigent; and 
(iv) the reformation of criminals, prostitutes or 
drunkards. 
Then section 3 provided that"··· where it has become 
or shall become impossible or impracticable to carry out 
the trusts uuon which any property is held, or the amount 
available has proved or shall prove inadequate to carry 
out the original charitable purpose, or such purpose has 
or shall have been already effected, or such pu1~ose is 
illegal or un(iertain, then the property so held or any 
pnrt or residue thereof may be disposed of for some other 
charitable purpose, or a combination of such purposes, 
in the manner and subject to the provisions hereinafter 
contained". 
·what is i mmediately apparent after reading the list 
of conditions necessary before such application is the 
finding the use of the word "may" which is permissive in 
meaning, and not the use of the word "shall" which is 
obligatory in meaning. Notwithstanding, then, the presence 
of any illegality or any uncerta inty the property or any part 
or residue could be applied (and not had to be) for another 
charitable purpose or combination of charitable purposes. 
l 
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Not infrequently, Courts have been obliged to construe 
"may" as obligatory but these instances amount more to 
judicial amelioration of drafting errors. If the 
Legislature had wished to guard against the Court 
construing "may" in this context as obligatory then 
it could have introduced the words "in the Court's 
discretion" or "if the Court thinks fit". This was 
not done and in the irmnediate consequent reformatory 
and consolidation Acts, the word "may" was repeated 
in the same context notably in the Religious, Charitable 
and Educational Trusts Act 1908 as amended until the 
time of the Chari table Trusts :..et ·1957 when "shall" 
appeared for the first time (in part III and Part IV, 
examined in detail post). 
Whenever the trustees had vested in them property 
under such circumstances"··· they may prepare or cause 
to be prepared a scheme for the disposition of the 
property ••• " Again "may" was used in section 4 but 
"shall" was used in the next section 5 because "Every 
such scheme ••• shall be submitted to the Attorney-
General, together with full information of all the facts 
upon which it is proposed to make such disposition, and 
with copies of any instruments necessary to explain the 
scheme so prepared ••• ". 
Certain powers and duties were then reposed in the 
Attorney-General. He could remit the proposed scheme to 
the trustees for amendment if he considered that it would 
not properly carry out the objects contemplated and he had 
to include in writing his objections to the scheme as 
13. 
proposed: section 5(1). He might report on the scheme 
submitted"·· and such report shall be laid before a 
Judge of the Supreme Court ••• or he may decline to 
make any such report and allow the scheme to be laid 
before the Judge •• ": section 5(2). 
Section 7 provided that "A4-Judge ... shall have 
jurisdiction and authority to hear and determine all 
matters relating to such scheme, and all proceedings 
therein shall be had in a summary way and the Judge 
may decide what persons shall be heard in support of 
or in opposition to the scheme". Provision was made 
in the Act for the Gazetting of the proposed scheme 
and its publication "twice in each week in one newspaper 
circulating in the judicial district •• for three weeks 
before •• (the) scheme shall be considered by the 
Supreme Court." (section 6). 
If the Judge was satisfied with the scheme (under 
section 8 the scheme proposed had to be "proper and not 
contrary to law, public policy, or good morals •• ") 
he had to make an order approving the scheme "with or 
without any modification or variation as he thinks fit •• " 
Section 9 allowed the Judge to adopt the report of 
the Attorney-General, section 12 for the Judge's order 
to be gazetted and section 13 for the Gazetting of 
notice of the refusal "of any scheme •• as soon as 
conveniently may be after the Attorney-General or a 
Judge of the Supreme Court shall have decided it ought 
to be refused together with a statement of the grounds 
for such refusal". Section 14 provided for"·· any 
I 
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variation or alte~ation •• wl1ether as originally 
adjusted or as varied or altered". 
All proceedings to enforce or oppose any scheme 
"may be taken in the Supreme Court either by ex parte 
petition or by summons before a Judge in Chambers a.nd 
the Court or Judge may make such orders as it or he 
may think fit respecting notice to parties and the 
hearing of such petition or summons:" section 18. 
Principal featur~s of t:!:1e Act 
That brief examination reveals the following 
features:-
(a) "Charitable purpose" was defined as to "include(s) 
the following purposes ••• 11 and therefore the use 
of the word "includes" denoted that the purposes 
named had to be regarded as instances and not as 
the only objects of charity. The same principle 
is applicable to Pemsel: Uni,mrsity of London v. 
YRrro~ (1857) 1 De G. & J. 72 at 79. 
(b) The grounds upon which property held upon charitable 
trust could be invoked to allow such property to be 
applied for other charitable purpose or combination 
of purposes were stated exhaustively and therefore 
each must be regarded as a condition-precedent before 
such property ''may" be disposed of. There was no 
mandatory condition that such property had to be so 
disposed of because "shall" was not used and that 
construction would obtain even if, for example, there 
had been illegality, uncertainty, impossibility, 
impracticability, or inadequacy to carry out the 
original charitable purpose. 
J 
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(d) 
15. 
There was 1~0 obligation upon the trustees to prepare 
a scheme for the disposition of the property. They 
"may prepare or cause to be prepared " . . . 
Once they so decided then every such scheme had to 
be submitted to the Attorney-General who had to be 
supplied ~ith the fullest detail. 
(e) The Attorney-General, then, had a number of 
options open to him: he might reject the proposed 
scheme and reqv.est the trustees to amend it or 
he might accept the scheme as proposed and report 
on it or not report on it and in either event he 
could file the proposed scheme in the St1preme 
Court. 
(f) Gazetting and publication of the proposed scheme 
in one newspaper were both mandatory. 
(g) The Judge had jurisdiction to decide what persons 
should be heard before him either -in support of 
or in opposition to the scheme. He could accept 
or reject the proposed scheme, and he could adopt 
the Attorney-General's report and make an order 
on it. 
(h) The order of the Judge had to be Gazetted. 
(i) Notice of the refusal of a scheme had to be gazetted. 
(j) Any scheme so adopted could be vari ed or altered. 
Principal c r itici sm of the Act 
These machinery provisions were scant and they warrant 
consideration now for in somewhat comparable form they 
have been largely repeated in successive Acts dealing 
with the administration and variation of charitable trusts. 
The discretion left to the Attorney-General in section 5 
[ 
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was wide. There was no provision i'or his to take into 
consideration any objections made by aggrieved parties 
and indeed there was no likelihood of such objections 
coming to his notice for the Attorney-General was 
simply required to state in writing "the objections 
which he entertains to the scheme as p!'oposed11 • It 
was left to the Judge to decide what persons should 
be heard in support of and in opposition to the scheme. 
There should have been provision in that Act 
allowing for all persons both interested ~n and opposed 
to the intended scheme to make representations not 
only to the Court (as must be intended by section 7 
when the Judge exercised his d~scretion to admit such) 
but likewise to submit a scheme to the Attorney-General 
so that when that judicial officer made his report he 
was able to acquaint the Court fully that the proposed 
scheme (as modified or not, according to his view of any 
contrary scheme or schemes submitted by aggr:isved persons) 
was proper and not contrary to law, public policy or 
good morals. 
Only if that provision had been included would the 
Court have been able to have been placed in a position 
to make an order instead of conceivably having been 
placed in the dilemma of having to reject the trustees' 
scheme and having to favour representations made at the 
Court hearing by aggrieved persons upon which the 
Attorney-General would not have been able to report, and 
so because of the procedural inadequacies of that Act 
of having been forced to ask the aggrieved persons to 
J 
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submit their competing scheme to the Attorney-General for 
his report and for their scheme and the Attorney-General's 
report having to be submitted afresh. 
Successive applications, therefore, were necessitated 
instead of simultaneous ones which would lrn.ve allowed the 
Attorney-General to have fulfilled his statutory function 
of making a report satisfying the Court that the scheme 
did or did not meet all the r equirements of section 8. 
The Act of 1886 precluded the Court of being able to see 
that in all cases that requirement W8S completely met. 
One repor ted case 
The 1886 Act appears to have resulted in only one 
case having been reported and then without any examination 
or application of the Act. In In re The Door of Hone, 
1,_he St Mary's 1·Tomen' s Home, and t he Sal vat ion Army ( 1905) 
26 NZLR. 96; sub nom. In re Auckland 1·to:nen' s Home Trust 
(1905) 7 G.L.R. 406, the Court considere.d an application 
for approval of a scheme to give the funds of an 
uni ncorporated association, called "The Auckland Women's 
Home", which had been closed, to an incorporated society 
called "The Door of Hope". The application was opposed 
by the St Mary's ·women's Home and by the Salvation Army 
both of which were claimants to the fund. Edwards J. 
rejected the claims of the t wo organisations opposing the 
scheme and then approved the scheme princi.pally on the 
ground that The Door of Hope was undenominational. He 
said ( at p. 100) : 
"The sole matter which I have to consider is 
the application of the fund in such manner 
as will most nearly approximate to the objects 
of the defunct Auckland Women 's Home.". 
""' 
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With respect, he was not required to find such an 
approximation. The Attorney-General had approved the 
scheme pursuan~ to the Charitable Trusts Extension Act 
1886, section 3 of which recited"··· the property so 
held or any part or residue thereof may be disposed 
of for some other charitable purpose, or a combination 
of such purposes, in the manner and subject to the 
provisions hereinafter contained." That section did 
to some degree modify the doctrine of cy-pres which 
Edwards J. clearly chose to invoke because his judgment 
contains no examination of the statute under which he 
could have approved the scheme irr~spective of the need 
for approximation. 
Notwithstanding the existence of the then Charitable 
Trusts Extension Act 1886, the advice of the Pri ,;y Council 
in Wallis v. Attorney-General (1903) A.C. 173 turned upon 
the successive rejection and application of a series of 
cy-pres schemes, initiating in the Supreme Court and 
culminating in the Judicial Committee. 
(III)THE RELIGIOUS, CHft~ITABLE AND EDUCATIONAL TRUSTS ACT 1908 
The definition of charitable purpose contained in 
section 2 cf the Charitable Trusts Extension Act 1886 was 
re-enacted by section 14 of the Religious, Charitable 
and Educational Trusts Act 1908 (which repealed and 
replaced the former Act) and pursuant to the Amendment 
Act 1928 (section 3) that definition was expressly made 
to include "every other charitable purpose which in 
accordance with the law of England is a charitable purpose". 
Section 3 of the 1886 Act was re-enacted by section 15 
[ 
19. 
("Property may be disposed of for other charitable purposes") 
of the substitutional 1908 Act. 
Section 15 of the Religious, Charitable and 
Educational Trusts Act 1908 recited: 
In any case where it becomes impossible or 
impracticable to carry out the trusts upon 
which any property held for particular 
purposes of a charitable nature is held, 
or the amount available proves inadequate 
to carry out the or.:.ginal charitable 
purpose, or such purpose has been already 
effected, or such purpose is illegal or 
uncertain, then the property so held or 
any part or residue thereof may be disposed 
of for some other charitable purpose, or 
a combination of such purposes, iP- the 
manner and subject to the provisions 
hereinafter contained. 
The word ninexpedient" was later inserted (pursuant 
to section 4 of the Amendment Act 1928) so that property 
could be disposed of for other charitable purposes "in 
any cases where it becomes impossible or impractical 
or inexpedient to carry out the trusts •• ". 
The 1951 Amendment Act made no material alteration 
to that section but the transposition and condensation 
of the phrase "for particular purposes of a charitable 
nature" clearly resulted in greater emphasis and better 
readability. The section now read,:-
20. 
In any case where property is held upon trust 
for a particular charitable purpose and it is 
impossible or impracticable or inexpedient to 
carry out that purpose, or that purpose has 
been effected already, or that purpose is 
illegal or uncertain, then the property so 
held or any part or residue thereof may be 
disposed of for some other charitable 
purpose, or a combination of such purposes, 
in the manner and subject to the provisions 
hereinafter contained. 
The remaining sections of the 1908 Act (as contained 
in Part III) were a substantial re-enactment of the 1886 
Act: 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
Trustees could prepare a scheme, pursuant to 
section 16 (a re-enactment of section 4 of the 
1886 Act); 
Scheme to be laid before Attorney-General, pursuant 
to section 17 (a re-enactment of section 5); 
Gazetting of notice of scheme, pursuant to section 18 
(a re-enactment of section 6); 
Jurisdiction vested in judge of Supreme Court, pursuant 
to section 19 (a re-enactment of section 7); 
When Judge might make or refuse order, pursuant to 
section 20 (a re-enactment of section 8). The 1928 
Amendment Act provided that a scheme approved under 
Part III of the principal Act might be altered 
(subject to the provisions of section 15 of the 
• 
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principal Act) "in the same manner in aJ.l respects 
as the original purpose or purposes W·ere altered, and 
in any such case the original purpose or purposes 
may be restored, with or without modifications". 
Judge might adopt Attorney-General's report, pursuant 
to section 21 (a re-enactment of section 9); 
* Order filed, pursuant to section 22 (a re-enactment 
of section 10); 
* Order of Judge to be Gazetted, pursuant to Section 24 
(a re-enactment of section 12); 
* Proceedings to enforce or oppose any scheme, pursuant 
to section 30 (a re-enactment of section 18). 
The accomnanving case law 
The li~itation involved in the cy-pres doctrine had 
been modified by section 15 of the 1908 Act as amended. 
Indeed in ~Jblic Trustee v. Attornev-General (1923) NZLR 
433 at 442 Hosking J. said: 
"All that appears to me to be required under 
s.15 is that the new purpose to which the 
property is applied is a charitable purpose 
within the meaning of Part III of the Act, 
without regard to its resemblance to the 
old purpose. No doubt the approximation 
of the new purpose to the old would not go 
unconsidered as an element in the matter 
of deciding upon the new purpose, but the 
Act does not appear to me to compel such 
approximation as the guiding principle". 
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That passage was expressly approved by Reed J. in 
In re Palmer (1939) NZLR 189 at 193. 
(Any lingering doubts present as to the applic~bility 
of the doctrine of cy-pres (nob'lithstanding the customary 
judicial comparison of the new purpose effected under the 
1957 Act with the settler's or testator's original purpose 
done (seemingly, at best1,more as a matter of deference 
than necessity) is nm1 completely dispelled by the 
comprehensive statement in Part III (and too in Part IV) 
of the current Act. That deference displayed by the 
Judiciary while commendable is not productive of good 
judgments and the time and effort expended would (with 
respect) be better devoted to reading and re-reading the 
words of Hosking J. and the appropriate sections in the 
Charitable Trusts Act). 
In In re VTilliams'Trust (1908) G.L.R. 133 section 76 
of the Trustee Act 1883 was invoked by ·the Court to give 
directions to trustees on the application of income of a 
trusts established by an Anglican archdeacon , amounting 
to $100,000. No other statute is mentioned in the 
judgment. 
In Solicitor-General v. Wanganui Borough (1919) NZLR 
763 the Court of Appeal held that a cy-pres scheme should be 
established so that the income could be paid to the Fire 
Board for the purposes of fire prevention. The Judgment 
makes no mention of the Religious, Charitable and Educational 
Trusts Act 1908. 
In Sadlier v. Attorney-General of New Zealand (1919) G.L.R. 
281 the Court approved the scheme prepared for the trustees for 
l 
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the establishment of a scientific institu~e. Chapman J 
said (at page 283): "I am satisfied that the scheme 
set out in the report does in its main features fall 
within the limits of the testator's intentions". The 
accent throughout is on the construction of the will 
and not on any statutory applicaticn and interpretation. 
In Methodist Theological College Counci.,l v. Guardian 
Trust and Executors Co. Ltd of N.Z. (1927) G.L.R. 394 the 
Court refused to apply the cy-pres doctrine concerning 
a bequest for the purchase of an organ for the college and 
a scheme varying the trust. Reed, J. said (at p.396): "I 
desire to say, that had I found there was a surplus, to 
which it would be necessary to apply the cy-pres 
doctrine, I should have declined to do so until the scheme 
had been submitted to the Attorney-General and I had heard 
him on the matter". The judgment contains no mention of 
any New Zealand statute or New Zealand case law. 
In Holy T.£..:ni..:!J' ( Otahuhu) Parish Trust Boa.rd v. General 
Trust Board of the Diocese of' Auckland, the judgment of 
Kennedy J. of March 27, 1929 is noted in the New Zealand Law 
Journal of April 30, 1929. A certain trust deed had provided 
inter alia that the building of a new church should not 
such 
be commenced until two thirds of the cost of/.building 
I\ 
and furnishings was available out of the trust fund. The 
conditions of the trust deed had not been literally complied 
with and the trust fund could not in conformity with the 
trust deed be applied towards the building of the new church 
then being erected. It was held that there was a possible 
" 
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remedy available under section 15 of the Religious, 
Charitable and Educational Trusts Act 1908 as amended 
which enabled property, held for a particular purpose 
of a charitable nature, to be applied cy-pres not 
only when it became impossible or impracticable but 
also when it became merely inexpedient to carry out 
the trusts upon which that property was held. 
The note on the judgment of this case has confused 
the cy-pres doctrine with the effect of the Religious, 
Charitable and Educational Trusts Act 1908 as amended 
under which there had been no need for the application 
of the property to purposes as near as possible to the 
intention of the settler, donor, testator (as the 
case may be). 
In re "The 'l'alce.puna WoI:1en' s Mer:10rial Fund 11 ( 1929) G. L. R. 
67, (1930) NZLR 39, Part IV of the Religious, Charitable 
and Educational Trusts Act 1908 was ordered to be applied 
in the seeking of an order of approval of a scheme for 
the disposition of funds raised by voluntary subscription. 
The same principle was applied in In re But1er (1930) G.L.R. 
1 !+5; and in l'lelline:ton Di oc esan Board of Trustees v. 
Attorney-General (1937) NZLR 746. 
In Kjar v. Masterton Borout;h Council, the unreported 
judgment of Ostler, J. of April 16, 1930 is noted in the 
New Zealand Law Journal of June 24, 1930. The question 
concerned the validity of a lease vested in the council 
in trust for a library purposes. Ostler J. held that 
even assuming that a corporation had no statutory power to 
grant such a lease yet in his opinion the lease was not 
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ultra vires the council. The trust for a library was a 
charitable trust. A municipal corporation had power to 
accept and administer such a trust: Public Trustee v. 
Wanganui Borou_g;h Council (1916) G.L.R. 486. Therefore 
the Council was the trustee of a charitable trust. 
The law in England before the passing of the Charitable 
Trusts Act 1853 was the law which was in force in New 
Zealand in 1887 when that lease was granted and was the 
law then still in force in New Zealand. 'rhe lease was 
therefore valid and plaintiff was entitled to have the 
provisions of its renewal carried out. 
The case is a minor one but it does illustrate the 
possible effect, no matter how indirect, of statutes in 
force (and since repealed) at the date of the creation 
of a number of long-established New Zealand charitable 
trusts. The Charitable Trusts Extension Act 1886, the 
Religious, Chari table and Educational T.rusts Act 1908 
as amended and the current Charitable Trusts Act 1957 cover 
a wide canvas but specific charitable trusts may often be 
dealt with by the statute in force at the date of their 
creation, which may of course be a private Act empowering 
such trust. 
In In re Palmer (1939) NZLR 188; (1939) G.L.R. 138 
a legacy was ordered to be administered in accordance with 
section 15 of the Religious Charitable and Educational 
Trusts Act 1908 as amended for the benefit of a children's 
home. 
In In re Travis (1947) NZLR 382 approval of a scheme 
under Part III of the Religious, Charitable and Educational 
Trusts Act 1908 as amended was refused on the grounds that it 
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had not been sho·.m that the trusts were impracticable 
or inexpedient or otherwise ineffective. The trustees• 
"Report on Scheme" had been approved by the Attorney-
General, the scheme or report had been advertised and 
one objection to it had been lodged. The trustees had 
apparently elected to seek Court approval of the 
intended scheme under the Act instead of having the 
will interpreted under the Declaratory Judgments 
Act 1908. 
The BuJ_lock-Webster Case 
The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court both statutory 
and inherent relating to the effectuation of charitable 
trusts by means of schemes was considered in In re Amelia 
Bullock-Webster (.dece2.sed) ( 1936) NZLR 814. A Memorandum 
on the matter of jurisdiction was prepared by counsel 
K.M. Gresson (as he then was) and appe~ded by Northcroft J. 
to his judgment. 
That Memorandum in traversing both history and 
application 
(1) Recites that "the numerous English statutes from the 
Charitable Trusts Act 1853 have no application to 
New Zealand, and there is nothing in New Zealand 
corresponding to the Charity Commis sioners to whom 
~any of the functions formerly exercised by the 
Court are today delegated. Possibly the Charities 
Procedure Act 1812 (Eng.) and the Charities Procedure 
Act 1832 (Eng.) are in force in New Zealand " . . . . 
(Clearly, as later suggested in the Memorandum the 
27. 
then Trustee Act 1908 (and now that of 1956) had made 
provision principally for breaches of trust; but 
the earlier part of the quoted material does not 
take into consideration Ostler J's judgment in 
Kjar v. Masterton Borough Corporation (unreported 
and noted in the New Zeal~nd Law Journal of June 24 
1930) a case concerning the validity of the 
council's lease. Ostler J. said "The law in 
England before the passing of the Charitable 
Trusts Act 1853 was the law which was in force in 
New Zealand in 1887 when that lease was first 
granted and was the law still in force in New 
Zealand". He said the lease of land vested in 
the corporation for library purposes was not 
ultra vires. The case does illustrate the conceivably 
continuing effect, no matter indirect, of certain 
enactments in force (and of course since repealed) 
at the date of the inception of some long-established 
New Zealand charitable trusts). 
(2) includes an unfortunate error in the penultimate line 
(on 817) which concludes the recital of section 15 
of the Religious, Charitable and Educational Trusts 
Act 1908 as amended: "or a continuation of such 
purposes in the manner and subject to the provisions 
hereinafter contained!' Combination in the statute 
should have been transcribed and not continuation. 
There is a significant difference. The Memorandum 
may have been handwritten. 
(3) fails to emphasise the cardinal point of that 
[ 
(4) 
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statute, the Court in dealing with trusts under the 
Act is not bound by the cy-pres doctrine. All that 
is necessary is the approval of the application of 
the property to a charitable purpose as defined by 
the Act: see Public Trustee v. Attorney-General (1923) 
NZLR 433, 442, per Hosking J. 
does not adequately differentiate between the instances 
when the cy-pres doctrine is demonstrably applicable 
(as in Bullock-vtebster) and when the then existing 
Act provided a means for the effectuation of a scheme. 
No mention is made of a number of cases decided in 
favour of the charity on the cy-pres principle with 
no reference to the then existing Act: Murdoch v. 
Attorney-General (1892 11 NZLR 502; In re the Trusts 
of the 1tHll of Jacob Joseuh {1907) 26, NZLR 504; 
9 G.L.R. 329; In Re Buckley, Public Trustee v. 
Wellington Society for the Prevention o-f Cruelty to 
Jmimals (Inc.) (1928) NZLR 148; (1928) G.L.R. 127; 
In re Camnbell , Peacock v. Ewen (1930) NZLR 713; 
(1930) G.L.R. 539; Standing Comnittee of the Diocese 
of htckland v. Campbell (1930) G.L.R. 162 and In re 
Wilson, Guardian Trust a~d Executors Co. Ltd v. 
Societv for Prevention of Crueltv to Animals, 
Auckland (Inc.) (1934) G.L.R. 54 
(5) f2ils to demonstrate the emerging statutory role in 
place of the doctrine of cy-pres in dealing with the 
variation of the purpose of subsisting charitable 
trusts: Public Trustee v. Attorney-General (supra) 
contains a most important enunciation of the law. 
• 
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(6) and misconstr tes the effect of secticn 75 of the 
Trustee Act 1908 in sucgesting that it may be 
invoked "for a scheme to be approved in the 
case of any trust where the circumstances so 
require ••• 11 and that "the more correct view 
would be that (it) strengthens or incorporates 
the jurisdiction which exists independe~tly 
(Section 75 allowed a trustee, executor or 
administrator to apply to the Court non any 
• • • " 
question respecting the management or ad.ministration 
of the trust prope~ty or the assets of any testator 
or intestate. Section 65 in the 1956 Act is similar 
in intent and effect. The case of In re Williams 
(1908) 11 G.L.R. 133 in support of the first 
suggestion is no authority regarding sche~es; all 
that the Court may do is to make a declaration as 
to the powers of the trustees in administering trusts 
funds. Directions will only be given on points of 
management and questions of will construction must be 
decided in the usual way: In re George Gould (1889) 
7 NZLR 733; In re Oliver (1927) G.L.R. 910; In re 
Griffiths (1910) 12 G.L.R. 533. 
The Memorandum (intituled "Memorandum of Counsel as to 
the Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in relation to Scheme 
for Administration of Chari table Trusts') has been given 
imprimatur by being appended to the judgment of Northcroft, J. 
but (with respect) it is neither definitive nor comprehensive. 
The Memorandum does not now appear to draw judicial notice; 
and in any case the innovations introduced in the consolidating 
• 
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Charitable Trusts Act 1957 have made it less useful 
aside from the criticisms noted (supra). 
(IV) THE CHAR.IT ABLE TRUS'rS ACT 195Z 
The Charitable Trusts Act 1957 came into force on 
January 1, 1958 and consolidated and repealed the 
Religious, Charitable and Educational Trusts Act 1908 
as amended. 
Under the 1908 Act there was 11 no special provision 
for the procedure to be adopted in the case of the 
failure of an original charitable purpose where part 
of the property or fund may come within s.15 and part 
· th · 32 11 11 ~ C J · d · T,r 1 1 • t r · wi in s. , 1•iyers, • . sai in ~.:. -L ing on lJ l02..§.§fill.. 
Board of Trustees v. Attorney-General (1937) NzLq 746 
at 748. Section 15 (Property may b e disposed of for 
other charitable purposes) formed the principal 
operative section in Part III (Extensio~ of Charitable 
Trusts) and section 32 (Funds, how rai~ed) the principal 
operative section in Part IV (Approp2~iation of Chari table 
Funds). 
The matter has been r emedied in t he 1957 Act by the 
complete re-drafting of the section.s in a new Part III 
(Schemes in respect of Certain Charitable Trusts) and 
of the sections in a substantially new Part IV (Schemes 
in Respect of Charitable Funds Raised by Voluntary 
Contribution). 
Part III represents in effect more than a statutory 
extension of the general jurisdiction of the Court to 
apply the cy-pres doctrine or to approve of schemes for 
the administration of certain charitable trusts or to 
prescribe the mode of administering a charitable trust. 
31. 
In general, it enacts that where property or income 
is held or given upon trust for a charitable purpose 
and it is impossible or impracticable or inexpedient 
to carry out that :purpose or the amount available is 
inadequate to carry out that purpose or that purpose 
has been effected already or that purpose is illegal 
or useless or uncertain then (whether or not there is 
any general charitable intention) the property and 
income or any part or residue thereof or the proceeds 
of sale thereof "shall be disposed of for some other 
charitable purpose or a combination of such purposes . . . 
The permissive "may" in section 15 of the 1908 Act and 
in section 3 of the :886 Act has been transformed into 
the mandatory "shall" in subsection (1) of section 32 
just recited. (examined fully nost). 
Then subsection (2) of the same section reverts 
to the permissive 11 may" when it provid'es that "in any 
case where any property or income is given or held upon 
trust or is to be applied for any charitable purpose 
and the property or the income which has accrued or 
will accrue is more than is necessary for the purpose, 
then (whether or not there is any general charitable 
intention) any excess property or income or proceeds of 
sale may be disposed of for some other charitable 
purpose or combination of such purposes ••• ". 
" 
Section 32 is expressly declared (in subsection (3)) 
not to operate to cause any property or income to be 
disposed of as provided in subsection (1) or subsection 
(2) if in accordance with any rule of law the intended 
gift would otherwise lapse or fail and the property or 
I 
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income would not be applicable for any other charitable 
purpose and in so far as the property can be disposed 
of under Part IV (dealt with post). 
Section 32 is expressly declared to extend to 
cases where the charitable purpose affecting any 
property or income is defined by a scheme approved 
by the Court under Part III or otherwise or approved 
by the Attorney-General under Part IV "and in any 
such case the original purpose or purposes may be 
restored, with or without modifications": subsection (4). 
Section 32 applies to both trusts created and to 
schemes approved both before and after the commencement 
of the Charitable Trusts Act 1957: January 1, 1958. 
Subsection (1) of Section 32 warrants careful 
comparison with the accompanying subsection (2) for in 
the first subsection the property or income must be 
disposed of for some other charitable purpose or 
combination of such purposes if any of the stated 
conditions obtain whereas in subsection (2) excess 
property or income already endowed with a charitable 
trust or arising from a charitable trust may be 
applied for some other charitable purpose or combination 
of such purposes. There is an obligation under the 
first subsection and a discretion or pennission under 
the second subsection to apply the excess property or 
income to some other charitable purpose or a combination 
of such purposes. The trust property and income is 
already impressed with that of a charitable trust and 
any excess arising therefrom be it property, income or 
a combination of both is similarly impressed with the 
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same charitable flavour. Hence the discretion 
reserved to the trustees to apply any excess in the 
charitable manner they wish. 
Subsection (1) denotes obligation for the use 
of the word "shall" signifies duty and not discretion. 
Jn re Martin (deceased) (1968) NZLR 289 is a 
case directly concerned with Part III. The question 
that arose was whether the Court had power under 
section 32 of the Charitable Trusts Act 1957 to 
distribute the capital of a charitable bequest where 
the will clearly provided that only income should be 
distributed. 
Tompkins J. (in his oral judgment) held that it 
had been abundantly proved that it was impracticable 
and inexpedient to carry into effect the charitable 
purposes of the testator in the way envisaged by him. 
His Honour said (at p.290) that section 32: 
"gives wide powers to the Court; which are 
expressed, in the language of the section, to 
apply to 'any case where any property or income 
is given or held on trust or is to be applied to 
any charitable purpose.' The Court is given 
power in the latter part of subs. (1) to deal 
with 'the property and income or any part or 
residue thereof or the proceeds of sale thereof'; 
the Court is empowered to dispose of that property 
or income for some other charitable purpose. I do 
not think the Court is limited in the exercise of 
this power to carrying out the provisions of the 
will, where it directs that the capital be held for 
"' 
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a charitable purpose but that the income only 
be distributed. The Court, in my view, is given 
a wide and general discretion to dispose of 
either the property or the income or the proceeds 
of sale of the property for some other charitable 
purpose. The section, in my view, certainly does 
not expressly limit that discretion; and I see no 
reason why it should be limited by the rules of 
law relating to the construction of the document 
creating the trust. This view was taken by 
Hosking J. in Public Trustee v. Attorney-Q_eneral 
(1923) NZLR 433, 442. He said, in considering 
whether the doctrine of cy-pres should be 
applied, 'I find no such limitation expressed in 
the Act'. He held that the doctrine of cy-pres 
did not apply, although the wishes of the testator 
were a major factor to be taken into consideration 
in approving any other scheme • 
"I think that the Court ••• may in its discretion 
approve a scheme which authorises the sale of the 
land, notwithstanding that the testator has 
directed it be held and leased. I think the 
section also gives power to distribute the 
proceeds of sale for the charitable purposes set 
out in the will or for other charitable purposes 
approved by the Court." Tompkins J. held that the 
instant scheme be approved without amendment because 
it was the best to be done to carry out the 
charitable purposes envisaged by the testator. 
Tompkins J. did not find it necessary to examine 
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section 34 for he found (at page 291) that the scheme 
had been "consented to by all parties" and clearly 
that unanimity would have strengthened the duty 
imposed upon the trustees to prepare a scheme. 
_&gyivocation, uncertainty, caused by "may" 
Section 34 contains a curious inconsistency when 
compared to the necessary mandatory and discretionary 
elements (denoted by the use of the words "shall" and 
"may") in section 32. Section 34 reads as follows: 
"Where the trustees of any such property or income 
are desirous that it shall be dealt with subject 
to this Part of this Act, they may prepare or 
cause to be prepared, in accordance with this 
Part of this Act, a scheme for this disposition 
of the property or income and for extending or 
varying the powers of the trustees or for 
prescribing or varying the mode of administering 
the trust". 
The use of the word "may" clearly denotes a 
permissive, discretionary element (and not a mandatory 
one), allowing and permitting, but not demanding the 
formulation of a scheme. 
Both section 16 of the Religious, Charitable and 
Educational Trusts Act 1908 as amended and the section 
which it re-enacted section 4 of the Charitable Trusts 
Extension Act 1886 used "may''• Section 34 represents 
a considerable re-drafting of the two earlier 
sections and the retention of the word "may" perhaps 
signifies possibly the Legislature's desire not to 
trammell in any way the common law duty vested in 
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trustees of ir.ipartiality between beneficiaries and 
their right if trustees of a charitable trust to 
apply to the Court for directions; see Moggrid@ 
v. Thackwell (1803) 7 Ves. 36. 
Beattie J. in Attorney-General v. Waipawa Hospital 
Board (1970 NZLR 1148 at 1153, 1154 said: 
"It is curious, however, that the word 'may' has 
been retained in s.34 despite the mandatory nature 
of s.32, but at least no one is empowered to 
prepare and submit a scheme other than the trustees. 
I accept ••• that s.34 imposes an obligation on 
trustees of a charity to prepare a scheme in every 
case where the original purpose cannot be carried 
out, but subject to consideration of any special 
statutory provisions affecting the disposition of 
the trust property. 
"No doubt no change was made in s.34 in mandatory 
terms because trustees even under an earlier 
section were under a duty to prepare a scheme. 
It could not have been intended that a stalemate 
would arise from inactivity on the part of 
trustees. It follows that if this view is correct, 
then the change in s.32 merely removed the 
Court's discretion, leaving unchanged the duty 
imposed on trustees at all times under s.34. In 
any event, the use of the word 'may' in s.34 
does not in my opinion conflict with the view 
,just expressed". 
With respect, neither does it substantiate such a view. 
.. 
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Later on page 1154 Beattie J. finds slightly 
firmer ground: 
"Craies on Statute Law, 6th ed. 285 points out 
that it was decided in R. v. Barlow (1693) 2 Salk. 609: 
That when a statute authorises the doing 
of a thing for the sake of justice or 
the public good, the word 'may' means 'shall'. 
That rule has been acted upon to the 
present time. 
"Even apart from statute and subject to the 
exception I have referred to, it is a duty of trustees 
of a charitable trust to apply to the Court if the main 
purpose of the trust cannot be carried out in its terms. 
See: And~ v. McGuffog (1886) 11 App. Cas. 313, 329 
per Lord Herschell L.C.". 
It is unfortunate and unnecessary that the matter 
should have to be subjected to such speculation in which 
(with respect) reality and accuracy are not met until 
the final sentence is read in this extract. The Courts 
have been compelled to construe "may" as obligatory and 
in effect to offer judicial amelioration of what is a 
drafting oversight. The substitution of "shall" for 
"may" is eminently justified by the right, indeed the 
duty, of trustees to apply to the Court for approval 
of the intended mode of application by way of variation 
of the subsisting charitable trust. 
The only justification for the retention of "may" 
occurred in the former Acts which used the permissive 
"may" in section 3 of the Charitable Trusts Extension 
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Act 1886 and in the re-enacted section 15 of the 
Religious, Charitable and Educational Trusts Act 1908 
as amended but since the enactment of the consolidating 
Charitable Trusts Act 1957 the new section 32 has 
differentiated (dealt with supra) between the conditions 
under which there is a mandatory disposition of 
property for some other charitable purpose and when 
there may be a discretionary application and presumably 
the draftsman has retained "may" in section 34 to avoid 
conflict but in so doing he has unwittingly introduced 
an element of uncertainty which has caused judicial 
speculation. 
Section 34 should be re-drafted so that it is in 
conformity with the conditions obtaining in section 32 
to show when trustees must prepare a scheme and when 
(pursuant to subsection (2) of section 32) they may 
prepare a scheme. It is essential that section 34 have 
the requisite degree of certainty and no element of 
ambiguity. The section at present is quite equivocal 
and this was not the Legislature's intention. Bad law 
has been the result. 
Section 34 then, should be re-drafted to provide 
inter alia that: 
(1) In any case to which the provisions of 
subsection (1) of section 32 shall apply the 
trustees shall prepare or shall cause to be 
prepared in accordance with this Part of this 
Act a scheme for the disposition of the property 
and income and for extending or varying the 
powers of the trustees or for prescribing or 
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varying the mode of administration of the 
trust; 
In any case to which the provisions of 
subsection (2) of section 32 apply the 
trustees may prepare or may cause to be 
prepared in accordance with this Part 
of this Act a scheme for the disposition 
of the excess property or income or 
proceeds of sale and for extending or 
varying the powers of the trustees or for 
prescribing or varying the mode of 
administration of the trust. 
Alternative scheme nrecluded 
Clearly Tompkins, J. in ~artin had too no need to 
examine the possibility of any al ternati.ve scheme for all 
the parties had given their consent to the scheme 
submitted; but had one or more of such otherwise 
consenting parties submitted an alternative scheme 
independent of or complementary (in part) to the 
trustees' scheme then the Court would have been precluded 
from approving any other scheme (no matter how meritorious) 
than that submitted by the trustees. Such, then, are the 
consequences of section 53 (which unlike those of the 
badly drafted section 34) are probably intentional 
even though they deprive the whole Act of the desirable 
element of beneficence. 
Section 53 (forming one of the Miscellaneous 
Provisions in Part V) reads as follows:-
Where application for approval of any scheme is 
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made to the Court under Part III or Part IV of this 
Act -
(a) The Court may decide what persons shall be 
heard before it in support of or in opposition 
to -tne scheme: 
(b) The Court shall have jurisdiction and authority 
to hear and determine all matters relating to 
the scheme: 
(c) The Court may make an order approving the 
scheme with or without modification, as it 
thinks fit. 
Accordingly, had one of the parties in Martin not 
given its consent but had instead submitted a proposal 
or report on its own scheme then the Court would have 
been precluded from acting upon it and would have been 
forced to limit its activity to the approval, amendment 
or rejection of the trustees' scheme. A successive 
application would have been necessary which would have 
caused delay and further expense. Hence, again the 
Act is benevolent but it is not beneficent. 
Tompkins J. had encountered the problem of the 
inadequacy of section 53 in a case three years earlier, 
in the Estate of Arthur Powys Whatman, an unreported 
Wellington judgment, dated July 16, 1965 in which he 
(at page 7 and 8) said: 
"· I would think, however, but without 
deciding the point, that if a trustee 
felt that there was reasonable doubt 
as to which of two or more schemes was 
preferable for the disposition of the 
• • 
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trust property, he would not be exceeding 
his powers under s.38" (sic) "by preparing 
alternative schemes, asking the Attorney-
General to report upon each and applying 
tc the Court for approval of one of them. 
Indeed, a trustee might well think it was 
his duty in the best interests of the 
trusts to do so. However this was not 
done in this case, and I agree that the 
power of the Court on this application is 
limited to approval, amendment or rejection 
of the Board's scheme. But in deciding this 
the Court must necessarily consider the 
alternative scheme put forward by the Council 
and the Society pursuant to their notices of 
opposition ••• 
"It seems to me that the Act might well be 
amended, so as to authorise those opposing 
approval to apply for approval of an 
alternative scheme, so that the Court could 
consider both schemes at the same time and 
avoid the possibility of the expense and 
delay of successive applications. However, 
the Act clearly contemplates that successive 
applications may be necessary because s.54 
provides inter alia that notice of the 
refusal of the Court to approve any scheme 
shall be published in the Gazette •• while 
s.56(2) provides that any refusal to the 
Court to approve any scheme shall not prevent 
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fresh steps being taken to obtain the 
approval to any other scheme in respect 
of the same property, income or money". 
(Tompkins J. on page 7 referred to section 38 which 
defines the meaning of the term "charitable purpose" 
under Part IV. With respect he must have intended to 
refer to section 35 (Part III) on the scheme to be 
laid before Attorney-General). 
T.A. Gresson, J. in In re Goldwater (1967) NZLR 
754, 756, expressed agreement with the conclusion of 
Tompkins J. in Whatman and acknowledged that the Court 
under section 53 could only approve or reject the 
trustees' scheme as submitted. He added: "·· and it 
(the Court) at present lacks the power to approve any 
alternative scheme put forward by the parties in 
opposition". 
Tompkins, J's awareness that the "Act clearly 
contemplates that successive applications may be 
necessary" still detracts from the efficacy of the 
section and provides no comfort for an aggrieved 
person or society. Clearly, it is in the spirit of 
the Act that the Court be acquainted with all the 
facts and those in an intended alternative scheme which 
may be both complementary (partially) to and in opposition 
with the trustees' scheme; and clearly too the Court 
can fulfil its functions under section 53 by having not 
only all parties present but also all schemes and 
intended proposals before it; and so to ensure that, 
each should be first submitted to the Attorney-General. 
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These amendments to section 53 would mean the matter 
of approval, amendment or rejection could be dealt 
with expeditiously and with the minimwn of expense 
and delay. This to some extent would minimise but 
not avoid the risk of and need for successive 
applications. 
Provisions as to Schemes 
Part IV relates to Schemes in Respect of Charitable Funds 
Raised by Voluntary Contribution and replaced Part IV 
(Appropriation of Charitable Funds) of the Religious, 
Charitable and Educational Trusts Act 1908 as amended and 
simultaneously introduced a nwnber of significant 
changes. 
Section 38 defines "charitable purpose" in the same 
manner as section 31 of the 1908 act (and as section 2 of 
the 1871 Act) by its recital that that term"·· shall 
include any of the following purposes: _ 11 
but section 38 extends the meaning to be ascribed to that 
term by declaring that "charitable purpose means every 
purpose which in accordance with the law of New Zealand 
is charitable." 
Section 40 considerably expands section 33 of the 1908 
Act ("Failure, & of Original Purpose,") (being section 4 of 
the 1871 Act) and expressly negatives the application of 
the cy-pres doctrine. The section alternates between the 
use of the words "shall" and "may", a differentiation not 
easily overlooked (see post) and a distinction practically 
not immediately explicable. 
Subsection (1) says that in any case if it becomes 
impossible or impracticable or inexpedient to carry out the 
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charitable purpose for which t:ie money raised is held, 
or if the amount available is inadequate to carry out 
that purpose, or that purpose has been effected 
already, or that purpose is illegal or useless or 
uncertain; and if the money has not been entirely 
applied and is not in the course of being applied for 
the charitable purpose for whicb it is held at any time 
after the expiration of one yearafter the contribution 
or receipt of any part of the money or the sale of any 
part of the goods, then whether or not there is 2ny general 
charitable intention, the money and the income therefrom 
or any part or residue thereof shall be disposed of for 
some other charitable purpose or a combination of such 
purposes in the manner and subject to the provisions of 
Part IV of the Act. 
If the conditions contained in clause (a) of 
subsection (1) of section 40 obtain (impossibility or 
impracticability or inexpedience or inadequacy of amount 
or completion of purpose or illegality or uselessness or 
uncertainty of purpose) and if the money has not been all 
applied and is not being applied after 12 months from 
the time of its contribution or receipt, then whether or 
not there is any charitable intention both the money 
and its income must be disposed of for some other 
charitable purpose or combination of charitable purposes • 
The use of "shall" demands such application. 
Subsection (2~ says that in any case where the 
money raised and the income which as accrued or will 
accrue or any residue is more than is necessary to 
• 
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carry out the original purpose, then any excess money 
or income may be disposed of for some other charitable 
purpose or a combination of charitable purposes. The 
use of "may" permits such application. 
In neither case is it necessary that there be 
any general charitable intention. 
The important distinction between these two 
subsections has apparently been not comprehended by 
the revising editors of Garrow's"Law of Trusts and 
Trustees" because in both the 3rd Edition 1966 
(consulting editor E.W. Henderson; editors N.C. Kelly 
and D.J. Whalary and the 4th Edition 1972 (editor 
N.C. Kelly) at page 146 and at page 170 respectively 
this same paragraph occurs: 
"Part IV of the Charitable Trusts Act 1957 
applies to cases in which money has been 
raised by way of voluntary contribution or 
by the sale of goods voluntarily contributed, 
or as the price of admission to any 
entertainment given for any charitable 
purpose or in any other manner of voluntary 
contribution: s.39. In any such case, if it 
becomes impossible or impracticable or inexpedient 
or the amount proves inadequate to carry out 
the original charitable purpose, or such purpose 
has already been effected or such purpose is 
illegal or useless or uncertain, then the 
moneys so raised or any residue thereof may 
be appropriated to some other charitable purpose 
or combination of charitable purposes: s.40. 
Similarly, when money raised in one of these 
J 
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ways has not been en~irely applied for the 
purpose for which it was raised, and it is not 
in course of being applied for that purpose, 
after one year from the time when it was 
raised, it may be applied for some other 
charitable purpose or combination of 
charitable purposes. In neither case is 
it necessary that there be any general 
charitable intention. Again if the amount 
ra.ised voluntarily is more than is necessary 
to carry out the original charitable purpose, 
the excess may be applied for some other 
charitable purpose or combination of 
charitable purposes". 
The effect of section 39 has been correctly 
paraphrased. The effect of section 40 has been incorrectly 
paraphrased as is demonstrably clear from a reading of 
the second sentence starting "In any such case •• " 
because clause (a) of subsection (1) by the use of the 
word "shall" (and not "may") makes it mandatory that 
11 the money and the income therefrom or any part or 
residue thereof" must"be disposed of for some other 
II charitable purpose or a combination of such purposes . . . . 
The meaning and effect of the two subsections are quite 
separate: there is an obligation demanding application 
under subsection (1); there is permission or discretion 
allowing application under subsection (2). The balance 
of the paragraph quoted shows that the distinction has 
not been grasped. What the two subsections do have in 
common is the absence of the need for any general 
I I 
47. 
charitable intention: this is made explicit by 
subsection (1). 
There seems no immediately apparent reason why 
there should be this distinction between the effect 
of subsection (1) and subsection (2). "May" was 
used in section 4 of the 1871 Act and in the 
identical section 33 of the 1908 Act but the new 
section in the 1957 Act is no mere repetition of the 
sections used formerly; but clearly the Legislature 
intended the permissive, discretionary element denoted 
by "may" in subsection (2) to apply to instances where 
an excess of funds has occurred and it is this excess 
"money or income" which may be disposed of for some 
other charitable purpose. This certainly gives the 
trustees a discretion as to how the excess funds are 
to be applied and for that reason there is present both 
benevolence and beneficence in this part of the Charitable 
Trusts Act 1957 because the total funds are already 
impressed with a charitable trust and money accruing 
thereto or investment arising therefrom will likewise 
be impressed with the same trust and so it is clearly 
proper that the decision of what application should be 
made of any surplus should be made by the trustees 
themselves, whether to "the original charitable purpose" 
or to "some other charitable purpose", and that is, then 
the intention and effect of subsection (2). 
The distinction, then, between the two subsections 
is both logical and practical and is further evidence 
that the common law cy-pres doctrine has not merely been 
modified by the Charitable Trusts Act 1957; it has indeed 
] 
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been supplemented, nay, supplanted. 
Decisions on "contributions" 
There does not seem to be any reported New Zealand 
case on section 40 and few on Part IV; but the Court 
has laid down that when funds are raised by voluntary 
contributions, then the procedure laid down by Part IV 
must be followed if a variation of the purposes is 
subsequently sought and this procedure is applicable 
even though part of the money raised, may have been 
actually applied for the purposes for which it was 
raised. If a sum of money is made up of contributions 
and bequests and subsequently a variation of purposes 
is necessitated, then it is necessary for the trustees 
to proceed under both Part III concerning the bequests 
and under Part IV concerning the money voluntarily 
contributed: ~llington Diocesan Board of ·rrustees v. 
Attorney-General (1937) NZLR 746; (1937) G.L.R. 444 in 
which case Myers, C.J. held that where . money (made up of 
contributions and bequests for the purpose of erecting 
a cathedral in the City of Wellington on a specified 
site) was held by the trustees as a separate fund for 
the erecting and furnishing of the cathedral. Subsequently 
it became impracticable and inexpedient to erect the 
cathedral on that site. A new proposal was made for 
its erection on another site. The Supreme Court held 
that there had been a change of purpose, and that the 
position was thenc i f~rther governed by Part III of the 
Religious, Charitable and Educational Trusts Act 1908 
as to the bequests and by Part IV of the same Act 
(both Parts enumerated the same under the consolidating 
I 
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·charitable Trusts Act 1957) as to the voluntary 
contributions. 
For largely similar reasons to those submitted 
concerning the re-drafting of section 34 (considered 
supra) section 42 should be logically and consistently 
extended so that the varying consequences of 
subsection (1)(a) and (b) and of subsection (2) 
of section 40 and of section 41 are clearly and 
unequivocally shoi>m. The use of the word "may" being 
permissive and discretionary in effect is applicable 
to only one of the eventualities postulated in 
section 40. No provision is made for the consequences 
flowing from the mandatory, obligatory "shall". 
Section 41 contains provisions allowing for the 
extension of powers or alteration of the mode of the 
administration of the trust, but the section has no 
application where the essential purpose of a 
modification of the powers contained in the trust 
instrument is in effect to change the method of 
operating a charity from that of a large institution 
into a series of smaller family-type units: Baptist 
Union of New Zealand v. Attorney-Ger.eral (1973) NZLR 42. 
Woodhouse J. (in an oral judgment) held that such new 
proposals should be put forward by way of a scheme 
under the Charitable Trusts Act 1957. 
Convening Contributor's Meeting 
As in the 1871 Act (and the 1908 Act as amended) 
any contributor to or holder of money voluntarily raised 
may set in motion the procedure laid down in the Charitable 
Trusts Act under Part IV of which a meeting of contribu-~ors 
is call ed by way of successive newspaper advertisements 
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approved by the Attorney-General and which specify 
"every newly proposed charitable purpose and every 
proposal for extending or varying the powers of the 
trustees or of prescribing or varying the mode 
of administering the t~~st and shall state the 
reason for every proposal relating to any new 
charitable purpose or to the powers of the trustees 
or the mode of administering the trust:" section 43(a). 
Again, any other contributor may advertise his 
intention to cove at the meeting for the adoption of 
some other newly proposed purpose and "that othGr 
purpose or proposal shall be distinctly specified 
in the advertisements published or the notice given 
under this section:" section 44. 
Again too, detailed provisions are made (in section 45) 
concerning proceedings at the meeting including the 
election of a scheme committee to prepare and formulate 
a scheme to give effect to the decisions of the meeting 
of the contributors. The scheme (pursuant to section 47) 
must be laid before the Attorney-General who has power 
to remit the scheme back to the committee with his 
suggested amendments. 
When the Committee has considered any suggestions, 
then the Attorney-General (under section 48) either 
approves the scheme as finally submitted to him and 
thereupon such approval "shall have the same effect 
as an approval of the scheme by the Court" or reports 
on the scheme and thereupon sends his report to the 
scheme committee which may then seek the approval of the 
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Supreme Court to the scheme. 
Section 48 then, allows schemes which meet with the 
Attorney=General's a?proval to be endowed with Supreme 
Court approval and avoids the necessity of the scheme 
committee having to seek di rectly the Court's approval 
by originating summons or ex parte motion. This 
represents a means of saving time and money and is a 
considerable improvement upon the somewhat hazy 
meaning in the 1871 Act which provided (under section 11) 
that i.f the Attorney-General II shall cor..sider the scheme 
proposed proper to effect the resoJ.ution of the meeting 
of contributors and not contrary to law" then he "shall 
certify the same and a verified copy of such scheme and 
certificate shall be filed .•• and an office copy 
thereof shall be admissible prima facie as proof of the 
scheme and certificate". It was not stated to what that 
degree of proof extended either to the existence of the 
scheme and certificate or to the legality of the scheme 
and certificate or to approval by the Supreme Court of 
the scheme and certificate. Clearly section 48 has 
provided a simple, expeditious and inexpensive way of 
obtaining the Supreme Court's approval of a scheme once 
such has met with the approval of the Attorney-General. 
The Charitable Trusts Act 1957 (Part IV), therefore, 
does measurably improve the 1908 Act and enhances the 
provisions relating to the disclosure of ·the proposed 
scheme and any proposals offered in opposition or in 
combination. The Court and the Attorney-General are both 
ensured of the fullest amount of detail produced by the 
advertisements and meetings. 
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Cy-pres doctrine un,justifiab},,.Y lingers on 
The Charitable Trusts Act 1957, then, is more than 
a gloss on the common law doctrine of cy-pres: it has 
supplemented, indeed suppanted it, with the result that 
the Court is no longer bound to follow or be guided by 
the testator's or settler's expressed intention. But 
New Zealand Courts when approving or rejecting the 
trustees' scheme (pursuant to section 53 of the 1957 Act) 
do often acknowledge a duty (which, with respect, is non 
existent) to the settler or testator of the trust property 
to dispose of it as nearly as possible in accordance 
with the settlor's or testator's intentions. 
T.A. Gresson, J. in Goldwater acknowledged(at 757) 
the presence of such a duty to the settler and he 
added "It (the Court) owes a duty also to those proposed 
to be benefitted by the trust, and to the public 
generally, to dispose of the fund or property as nearly 
as possible in accordance with the charitable purposes 
of the trust, and in such a way as will best serve the 
interests of those intended to be benefitted". 
T.A. Gresson, J. had been relying upon a similar 
statement in Whatman, in which Tompkins J. added (at p.11) 
"It (the Court) is not bound however by the cy-pres 
doctrine as a guiding principle and may, if the 
original charitable purpose cannot be carried out, 
approve a scheme without regard to its resemblance to 
the old purpose. Tompkins, J. added: 
"It must, of course, see that the scheme 
complies with s.56, i.e. that it is a proper 
one, and should carry out the desired 
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purpose or proposal, and is not contrary 
to law or public policy or good morals; 
and that it can be approved under Part III; 
that its purpose is charitable and can be 
carried out, and that the requirements of 
the Act have been carried out". 
The Court is not intended by the Statute to be 
hampered about equating or approximating the new 
purpose with the old purpose of the settlor or 
testator when approving a scheme to vary a subsisting 
charitable trust. The Court's acknowledgment at times 
of the expressed intentions of the settler or testator 
may (at best) be more a matter of judicial deference 
than of statutory obligation and in no way is the Court 
compelled to make such acknowledgement any part of 
its guiding principle. It may be essentially a matter 
of courtesy and deference 1.vhich may help the Court 
to formulate a new scheme; but there is nothing in the 
Charitable Trusts Act requiring such. The Courts are 
detectably straying from their duty and the reasons for 
such deviation can be attributed to faulty expression 
by the Legislature as well as to text authorities and 
Counsel. 
In In re Strong (1956) NZLR 274 it was again laid 
down that section 15 of the Religious, Charitable and 
Educational Trusts Act 1908 as amended applied in any 
case where property was held upon trust for a charitable 
purpose and that to bring a trust within that section 
it was not necessary to show a general charitable intention 
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which would otherwise be necessary to invoke the 
general jurisdiction of the Court under the doctrine 
of cy-pres. 
In In re Goldwater (1967) NZLR 754 at 757 the 
Court reiterated that it must be satisfied of the 
impossibility or impracticability or inexpediency of 
carrying out the trusts of a will before it might 
approve a scheme not conforming to those trusts and 
that the Court could only approve or reject a scheme 
submitted and had no authority to approve any 
alternative scheme advanced by parties in opposition. 
Emulated by Western Australia 
The New Zealand Legislature may take some 
justifiable pride in that the Charitable Trusts Act 
19.57 was adopted virtually in toto by the Western 
Australian Parliament which enacted the Charitable 
Trusts Act in 1962. No amendments have since been 
made to the latter Act. In the Western Australian 
Law Reports no judgments have been reported on any 
of the matters examined in this paper. In the 
absence of any amendments and Courts reports there 
is no need for any satisfaction by New Zealand 
because most matters on the variation of charitable 
purposes are (as in New Zealand) by ex parte motion 
and sometimes by originating summons and with the 
modern pressure on litigation and the shortage of 
space for Court reports, few charitable trusts cases 
are reported. 
The time has arrived now for a fresh look at the 
New Zealand approach to charitable trusts and more 
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particularly to the statutory conditions governing 
variation of purposes to which charitable trusts 
may now predictably be seeking approval. 
(V) SU11JVIARY OF PRINCIPLES 
It is now possible to summarise the principles 
enunciated in the common law doctrine of cy-pres and 
the statutory effect upon that doctrine in relation 
to the variation of the purposes of subsisting 
charitable trusts: 
• In its modern application the doctrine denotes 
and is applied "as near as possible" and in jurisdictions 
where the doctrine has not been altered, modified or 
supplanted by statutory provisions, the Courts have 
constantly insisted upon getting as close as possible 
to the original intention of the testator, settlor or 
donor (as the case may be). 
• In New Zealand there has been a gradual modification, 
supplementing and finally supplanting of the doctrine 
through the evolution of statutory enactments concerned 
both with the variation of purposes of subsisting 
charitable trusts and the disposition of funds of 
defunct charitable societies to other charitable 
organisations. 
• In cases coming within the Charitable Trusts Act 
1957 it is not necessary to prove a general charitable 
intention nor need the property be applied to a purpose 
as near as possible to the intention of the donor. This 
was laid down as long ago as 1923 (in Public Trustee v. 
Attorney-General (supra) but there has been a detectable 
judicial reluctance for the Courts to give full 
application and demonstration of this principle. It is 
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often disguised as a matter of judicial deference to 
the wishes of the testator in the formulation of the 
new scheme but must be regarded too as a legacy of 
the old cy-pres doctrine which still exerts an 
indirect, persuasive effect on the Courts. Neither 
Counsel nor the Court is doing its correct work. 
(VI) CONCLUSIONS AND THEN RECOMME!'fDATIONS 
It j_s now felt that the foregoing critical survey 
justifies the following conclusions being set down, and 
then some recommendations. 
THAT the Courts and Counsel and the law profession 
generally and text-book wr.iters on trusts in 
New Zealand have all totally misconceived an 
important branch of the law on the variation 
of charitable trusts. 
THAT the fault is partly the Legislature's because 
of inadequate legislation and partly Counsel's 
through its failure to draw to the Court the 
principles enshrined in Public Trustee v. 
Attorney-General. 
~ the Charitable Trusts Act 1957 represents the 
culmination of the statutory provisions 
relating to the variation of the purposes of 
subsisting charitable trusts and the disposition 
of funds of defunct charitable societies to 
existing charitable associations. 
~ such evolution of statute over the last 100 years 
has not been accompanied by any degree of 
perfection and that there are a number of 
matters where the Act could be amended so 
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that it is characterised by both benevolence 
(as at present) and beneficence (which is 
lacking). 
THAT the provisions contained in Part III of the 
Act should be extensively amended to allow 
the Court to approve any alternative scheme 
or to accept and approve a combination of 
the scheme submitted by the trustees with 
that of part of such alternative scheme 
put forward by parties in opposition. 
THAT comparable provisions mutatis mutandis to those 
obtaining in Part IV be included in Part III 
so that there.is provided the fullest disclosure 
of the trustees' scheme and of any proposals 
offered in combination with or opposition to 
that scheme and so that the Court is offered 
the fullest degree of information and the 
Attorney-General likewise in preparing his 
Report or Reports on the Scheme or Schemes 
(as the case may be). 
THAT the doubt and uncertainty in the meaning and 
effect of section 34 be removed by its amendment 
to cover the separate consequences provided for 
in subsection (1) and subsection (2) of 
section 32. 
THAT for similar reasons(and too on the suggested 
basis for amendment already indicated) 
section 42 should be amended to specify 
precisely the varying consequences delineated 
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in section 40 and in section 41. 
THAT statutory acknowJ.edgment be forcibly given that 
the Court in giving approval of a new purpose 
is under no duty or obligation to consider the 
original purpose or to equate that purpose in 
any way with the new purpose and that in the 
exercise of any judicial discretion a 
distinction must be drawn between deference 
to and dictation by the settler or testator 
(as the case may be). 
THAT accordingly the Courts be enjoined to bear in 
mind the words of Hosking J. in Public Trustee v. 
Attorney-General that while approximation of the 
new purpose to the old would not go unconsidered 
as an element in the matter of deciding upon the 
new purpose such approximation should not be 
regarded as the guiding principle; and that the 
Courts should be enjoined to refrain from 
acknowledging (as did Gresson, J. in Goldwater 
at 757 and Tompkins, J. in ¼'hatman (at p.11) 
that the Court owes a duty to the settler to 
dispose as nearly as possible in accordance with 
the wishes of the settler and also to those 
proposed to be benefitted by the trust and to the 
public generally to dispose of the fund or 
property as nearly as possible in accordance 
with the charitable purposes of the trust. 
Deference to such is permissible but not 
dictation which is raised when the term duty 
is acknowledged. 
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TH.Ji.Tin amending the Charitable Trusts Act 1957 or 
ideally in its repeal and consolidation statutory 
recognition be given both to the principles 
of be~lence and beneficence to promote 
and inculcate the concept of charity, which 
with existing privileges associated with the 
law of charitable trt1sts the law for centuries 
has attempted to encourage. 
THAT the above matters be submitted to the appropriate 
Equity Committee of the Law Revision 
Commission. 
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